Pages that link to "Item:Q1077313"
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The following pages link to The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (Q1077313):
Displaying 50 items.
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms (Q1338121) (← links)
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues (Q1368881) (← links)
- Games of manipulation in marriage problems (Q1369072) (← links)
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets (Q1381985) (← links)
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods. (Q1415914) (← links)
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. (Q1420524) (← links)
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (Q1577962) (← links)
- Mutually best matches (Q1650271) (← links)
- Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching (Q1651221) (← links)
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites (Q1662656) (← links)
- Many-to-one matchings without substitutability (Q1668291) (← links)
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints (Q1677256) (← links)
- Iterative voting and acyclic games (Q1677436) (← links)
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets (Q1684134) (← links)
- Constitutions and groups (Q1691356) (← links)
- Equivalences between two matching models: stability (Q1714490) (← links)
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets (Q1735744) (← links)
- Mathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists (Q1737478) (← links)
- The lattice of envy-free matchings (Q1753285) (← links)
- Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets (Q1756324) (← links)
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples (Q1772667) (← links)
- Protective behavior in matching models (Q1804637) (← links)
- Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem. (Q1811235) (← links)
- Non-cooperative matching games (Q1824573) (← links)
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment (Q1885915) (← links)
- Preference extension rules for ranking sets of alternatives with a fixed cardinality (Q1923819) (← links)
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598) (← links)
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (Q1927736) (← links)
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market (Q1934818) (← links)
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry) (Q1975360) (← links)
- Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets (Q1984501) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable (Q2002070) (← links)
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788) (← links)
- Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model (Q2033997) (← links)
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences (Q2034808) (← links)
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand (Q2036905) (← links)
- Gradual college admission (Q2067380) (← links)
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets (Q2078071) (← links)
- College admissions with tuition transfers (Q2078089) (← links)
- Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings based on individual and collective performances (Q2092777) (← links)
- Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies (Q2098899) (← links)
- Bipartite choices (Q2105872) (← links)
- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets (Q2106759) (← links)
- Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets (Q2121461) (← links)
- Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028) (← links)
- Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets (Q2201710) (← links)
- Entering classes in the college admissions model (Q2212783) (← links)
- A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming (Q2246170) (← links)
- Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching (Q2268127) (← links)
