Pages that link to "Item:Q1162428"

The following pages link to Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory (Q1162428):

Displaying 38 items.

• Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey (Q1656983) (← links)
• Implementation via rights structures (Q1757583) (← links)
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals (Q1800965) (← links)
• The consistency principle for games in strategic form (Q1814778) (← links)
• An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability (Q1814807) (← links)
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox. (Q1867814) (← links)
• Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization (Q1887541) (← links)
• Two-person game forms guaranteeing the stability against commitment and delaying tactics (Q1893192) (← links)
• Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms (Q1905052) (← links)
• Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice (Q1938828) (← links)
• Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs (Q1974051) (← links)
• Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form (Q2070570) (← links)
• Strategy-proof popular mechanisms (Q2092775) (← links)
• Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets (Q2106759) (← links)
• Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations (Q2173388) (← links)
• On effectivity functions of game forms (Q2268107) (← links)
• Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? (Q2288521) (← links)
• A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise (Q2329696) (← links)
• Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies (Q2357811) (← links)
• Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games (Q2417148) (← links)
• Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games (Q2433701) (← links)
• Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions (Q2452268) (← links)
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets (Q2455666) (← links)
• War and peace in veto voting (Q2456439) (← links)
• Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences (Q2516133) (← links)
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization (Q2641198) (← links)
• ``How characteristic are characteristic functions?'' (Q2641230) (← links)
• Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games (Q2667285) (← links)
• (Q3384162) (← links)
• Game Quantification Patterns (Q3601804) (← links)
• ON THE COMPLEXITY OF COALITIONAL REASONING (Q4795949) (← links)
• Self-implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium (Q5111113) (← links)
• Social Choice Theory (Q5150296) (← links)
• GAME FORMATS AS CHU SPACES (Q5294345) (← links)
• An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria (Q5932220) (← links)
• Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments (Q5955034) (← links)
• Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise (Q6109850) (← links)
• The reciprocity set (Q6559458) (← links)