Pages that link to "Item:Q1242792"
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The following pages link to Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods (Q1242792):
Displaying 50 items.
- The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games (Q1735811) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited (Q1757579) (← links)
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation (Q1792571) (← links)
- House allocation with existing tenants (Q1809490) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (Q1867775) (← links)
- The kidney exchange problem: how hard is it to find a donor? (Q1931639) (← links)
- Three-sided stable matchings with cyclic preferences (Q1959723) (← links)
- Housing markets through graphs (Q1959727) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences (Q1995476) (← links)
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences (Q2025006) (← links)
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare (Q2030716) (← links)
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form (Q2070570) (← links)
- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties (Q2075459) (← links)
- Matching with ownership (Q2075636) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade (Q2108764) (← links)
- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets (Q2138369) (← links)
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities (Q2138371) (← links)
- On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets (Q2138378) (← links)
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? (Q2152118) (← links)
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses (Q2222205) (← links)
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values (Q2222222) (← links)
- Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market (Q2267527) (← links)
- Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods (Q2270334) (← links)
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
- Ex-ante efficiency in assignments with seniority rights (Q2318115) (← links)
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem (Q2319628) (← links)
- Matching with restricted trade (Q2329419) (← links)
- Matching with partners and projects (Q2334133) (← links)
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (Q2334138) (← links)
- Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability (Q2347998) (← links)
- Non fixed-price trading rules in single-crossing classical exchange economies (Q2353698) (← links)
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain (Q2386134) (← links)
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence (Q2387316) (← links)
- Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems (Q2398192) (← links)
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments (Q2409677) (← links)
- Core concepts for incomplete market economies (Q2427860) (← links)
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects (Q2436293) (← links)
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects (Q2444698) (← links)
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets (Q2453416) (← links)
- Reducing rank-maximal to maximum weight matching (Q2465632) (← links)
- Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts (Q2482677) (← links)
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2491032) (← links)
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf (Q2569386) (← links)
- The exchange-stable marriage problem (Q2576343) (← links)
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited (Q2628708) (← links)
- A reformulation of von Neumann-Morgenstern stability: \(m\)-stability (Q2637410) (← links)
- Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings (Q2640416) (← links)
- Replica economies with congested public goods (Q2640425) (← links)
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities (Q2668990) (← links)
