Pages that link to "Item:Q1283855"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement (Q1283855):
Displaying 50 items.
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents (Q1735759) (← links)
- The lattice of envy-free matchings (Q1753285) (← links)
- Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation (Q1753433) (← links)
- College assignment as a large contest (Q1753683) (← links)
- School choice with vouchers (Q1757536) (← links)
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (Q1757561) (← links)
- A college admissions clearinghouse (Q1757598) (← links)
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized (Q1757600) (← links)
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice (Q1787522) (← links)
- The stable \(b\)-matching polytope revisited (Q1801060) (← links)
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments (Q1867834) (← links)
- Student admissions and faculty recruitment (Q1885915) (← links)
- Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (Q1927736) (← links)
- The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market (Q1934818) (← links)
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q1939517) (← links)
- Preferences and the price of stability in matching markets (Q1945450) (← links)
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry) (Q1975360) (← links)
- Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability (Q1984462) (← links)
- Graduate admission with financial support (Q1985735) (← links)
- School choice with priority-based affirmative action: a responsive solution (Q1996170) (← links)
- Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations (Q1996172) (← links)
- Some further properties of the cumulative offer process (Q2013375) (← links)
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (Q2021788) (← links)
- Improving solution times for stable matching problems through preprocessing (Q2027037) (← links)
- Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand (Q2036905) (← links)
- Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (Q2049501) (← links)
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities (Q2051512) (← links)
- School choice in Guangzhou: why high-scoring students are protected? (Q2052523) (← links)
- School choice with hybrid schedules (Q2052531) (← links)
- Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program (Q2059096) (← links)
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice (Q2061119) (← links)
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
- Gradual college admission (Q2067380) (← links)
- College admissions with tuition transfers (Q2078089) (← links)
- A collection of constraint programming models for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences (Q2079273) (← links)
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion (Q2099060) (← links)
- Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism (Q2105701) (← links)
- Bipartite choices (Q2105872) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade (Q2108764) (← links)
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? (Q2125094) (← links)
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories (Q2140313) (← links)
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? (Q2152118) (← links)
- Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools (Q2173082) (← links)
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093) (← links)
- What you don't know can help you in school assignment (Q2178019) (← links)
- Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028) (← links)
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions (Q2206795) (← links)
- Entering classes in the college admissions model (Q2212783) (← links)
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis (Q2218558) (← links)
