The following pages link to On cores and indivisibility (Q1843369):
Displaying 50 items.
- Housing markets through graphs (Q1959727) (← links)
- A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games (Q1959733) (← links)
- Market allocation of indivisible goods (Q1966227) (← links)
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation (Q1973452) (← links)
- Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem (Q1985723) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences (Q1995476) (← links)
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching (Q2002058) (← links)
- On random stable partitions (Q2002063) (← links)
- A competitive partnership formation process (Q2016227) (← links)
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences (Q2025006) (← links)
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets (Q2025051) (← links)
- Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare (Q2030716) (← links)
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints (Q2044984) (← links)
- Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form (Q2070570) (← links)
- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties (Q2075459) (← links)
- Matching with ownership (Q2075636) (← links)
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects (Q2078057) (← links)
- A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice (Q2084017) (← links)
- Strategy-proof popular mechanisms (Q2092775) (← links)
- Tie-breaking and efficiency in the laboratory school choice (Q2095270) (← links)
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion (Q2099060) (← links)
- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler (Q2100102) (← links)
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market (Q2100651) (← links)
- Bipartite choices (Q2105872) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade (Q2108764) (← links)
- Gainers and losers from market integration (Q2127893) (← links)
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (Q2138086) (← links)
- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets (Q2138369) (← links)
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities (Q2138371) (← links)
- Trading probabilities along cycles (Q2138374) (← links)
- On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets (Q2138378) (← links)
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? (Q2152118) (← links)
- Mechanisms for trading durable goods (Q2152120) (← links)
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked (Q2155231) (← links)
- On the equivalence of two competing affirmative actions in school choice (Q2157898) (← links)
- On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093) (← links)
- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains (Q2173423) (← links)
- A market design approach to job rotation (Q2178013) (← links)
- Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028) (← links)
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model (Q2205990) (← links)
- A revelation principle for obviously strategy-proof implementation (Q2212777) (← links)
- What matters in school choice tie-breaking? How competition guides design (Q2220932) (← links)
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses (Q2222205) (← links)
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values (Q2222222) (← links)
- Minimal envy and popular matchings (Q2242327) (← links)
- The unbinding core for coalitional form games (Q2243509) (← links)
- Introduction to computer science and economic theory (Q2253830) (← links)
- Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market (Q2267527) (← links)
- Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods (Q2270334) (← links)
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
