The following pages link to Kidney Exchange (Q3159691):
Displaying 50 items.
- Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants (Q2059051) (← links)
- Matching with property rights: an application to Korean teacher transfer program (Q2059096) (← links)
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm (Q2060701) (← links)
- Matching with ownership (Q2075636) (← links)
- A theoretical and computational equilibria analysis of a multi-player kidney exchange program (Q2083966) (← links)
- Bipartite choices (Q2105872) (← links)
- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets (Q2106759) (← links)
- On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets (Q2138378) (← links)
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home? (Q2152118) (← links)
- Parameterized approximations for the two-sided assortment optimization (Q2157918) (← links)
- Primary versus secondary infrastructure capacity allocation mechanisms (Q2158023) (← links)
- E-platooning: optimizing platoon formation for long-haul transportation with electric commercial vehicles (Q2171599) (← links)
- Stochastic packing integer programs with few queries (Q2191766) (← links)
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective (Q2231919) (← links)
- Stable fractional matchings (Q2238635) (← links)
- A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies (Q2254237) (← links)
- Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods (Q2270334) (← links)
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
- Obvious manipulations (Q2288530) (← links)
- Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size (Q2294116) (← links)
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences (Q2306268) (← links)
- An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave (Q2308795) (← links)
- An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism (Q2346377) (← links)
- Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange (Q2347782) (← links)
- New insights on integer-programming models for the kidney exchange problem (Q2356206) (← links)
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms (Q2359384) (← links)
- ReGale: some memorable results (Q2389290) (← links)
- Matching with waiting times: the German entry-level labor market for lawyers (Q2416650) (← links)
- The housing problem and revealed preference theory: duality and an application (Q2434968) (← links)
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects (Q2436293) (← links)
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects (Q2444698) (← links)
- Kidney exchange: further utilization of donors via listed exchange (Q2444699) (← links)
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion (Q2482673) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf (Q2569386) (← links)
- Randomized parameterized algorithms for the kidney exchange problem (Q2632525) (← links)
- Improved instance generation for kidney exchange programmes (Q2669768) (← links)
- Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses (Q3058693) (← links)
- (Q3552447) (← links)
- Size Versus Stability in the Marriage Problem (Q3602826) (← links)
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities (Q4612461) (← links)
- Placement Optimization in Refugee Resettlement (Q5031637) (← links)
- Recourse in Kidney Exchange Programs (Q5086017) (← links)
- On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets (Q5129171) (← links)
- Ignorance Is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching with Few Queries (Q5130481) (← links)
- Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)
- MAXIMUM WEIGHT CYCLE PACKING IN DIRECTED GRAPHS, WITH APPLICATION TO KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROGRAMS (Q5189989) (← links)
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses (Q5870368) (← links)
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems (Q5892304) (← links)
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems (Q5965780) (← links)
