Pages that link to "Item:Q756630"

The following pages link to Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods (Q756630):

Displaying 43 items.

• Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets (Q2138369) (← links)
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities (Q2138371) (← links)
• Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values (Q2222222) (← links)
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
• Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem (Q2319628) (← links)
• Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (Q2334138) (← links)
• Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain (Q2386134) (← links)
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence (Q2387316) (← links)
• Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems (Q2398192) (← links)
• Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments (Q2409677) (← links)
• Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects (Q2436293) (← links)
• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects (Q2444698) (← links)
• Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets (Q2453416) (← links)
• Welfare and stability in senior matching markets (Q2482669) (← links)
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions (Q2482681) (← links)
• School choice: an experimental study (Q2491034) (← links)
• An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf (Q2569386) (← links)
• The exchange-stable marriage problem (Q2576343) (← links)
• Multi resource allocation with partial preferences (Q2680798) (← links)
• Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms (Q2682797) (← links)
• On reachable assignments in cycles (Q2695447) (← links)
• Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey (Q2854007) (← links)
• Nash Implementation of Competitive Equilibria in a Model with Indivisible Goods (Q3974548) (← links)
• TWO EXAMPLES IN A MARKET WITH TWO TYPES OF INDIVISIBLE GOOD (Q4407202) (← links)
• Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities (Q4612461) (← links)
• Market Design (Q5150291) (← links)
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods (Q5931981) (← links)
• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Q5932333) (← links)
• House allocation with transfers (Q5958896) (← links)
• Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems (Q6074889) (← links)
• Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof (Q6117767) (← links)
• Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf (Q6121908) (← links)
• Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange (Q6125932) (← links)
• Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints (Q6145529) (← links)
• Stability of an allocation of objects (Q6156320) (← links)
• A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule (Q6156333) (← links)
• A Lattice Linear Predicate Parallel Algorithm for the Housing Market Problem (Q6488434) (← links)
• Computational complexity of \(k\)-stable matchings (Q6546302) (← links)
• Top trading cycles (Q6559462) (← links)
• Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects (Q6565774) (← links)
• Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent (Q6565778) (← links)
• Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets (Q6584596) (← links)
• Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods: a comment (Q6636915) (← links)