The following pages link to Constrained school choice (Q840677):
Displaying 45 items.
- Manipulability in school choice (Q2231403) (← links)
- The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions (Q2236864) (← links)
- Self-selection in school choice (Q2273935) (← links)
- Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility (Q2273939) (← links)
- Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case (Q2294296) (← links)
- Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach (Q2294355) (← links)
- Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism (Q2318116) (← links)
- On the welfare effects of affirmative actions in school choice (Q2318120) (← links)
- Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications (Q2323297) (← links)
- The modified Boston mechanism (Q2334829) (← links)
- Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms (Q2357813) (← links)
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice (Q2362200) (← links)
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (Q2402812) (← links)
- Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments (Q2409677) (← links)
- Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules (Q2416641) (← links)
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems (Q2424243) (← links)
- School choice with neighbors (Q2425195) (← links)
- A dynamic school choice model (Q2435894) (← links)
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China (Q2442836) (← links)
- The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
- School choice: an experimental study (Q2491034) (← links)
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof (Q2513288) (← links)
- Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
- Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited (Q2628708) (← links)
- Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study (Q2673787) (← links)
- School choice with preference rank classes (Q2681516) (← links)
- Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms (Q2682797) (← links)
- Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via Correlated-Lottery Implementation (Q2941420) (← links)
- Controlled School Choice with Soft Bounds and Overlapping Types (Q2962569) (← links)
- School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup> (Q3162725) (← links)
- (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice (Q5049121) (← links)
- The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence (Q5058194) (← links)
- Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible (Q5964686) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)
- Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis (Q6084802) (← links)
- A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism (Q6168823) (← links)
- The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice (Q6176756) (← links)
- The law of large numbers for large stable matchings (Q6554216) (← links)
- Robustness to manipulations in school choice (Q6570723) (← links)
- Capacity design in school choice (Q6584598) (← links)
- Purchasing seats in school choice and inequality (Q6646171) (← links)
- School choice with farsighted students (Q6665658) (← links)
