Pages that link to "Item:Q1300686"
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The following pages link to A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms (Q1300686):
Displaying 16 items.
- The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (Q2482637) (← links)
- Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms (Q2482644) (← links)
- Public goods with congestion (Q2496791) (← links)
- Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival (Q2685832) (← links)
- A general non-central hypergeometric distribution (Q4975167) (← links)
- Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries. (Q5002792) (← links)
- Assembly Problems (Q5022151) (← links)
- Implementation Theory (Q5150289) (← links)
- Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply (Q5937321) (← links)
- When Walras meets Vickrey (Q6059566) (← links)
- Trade of a common value good (Q6086121) (← links)
- Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements (Q6093777) (← links)
- Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games (Q6096591) (← links)
- Collective decision through an informed mediator (Q6564042) (← links)
- On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values (Q6581890) (← links)
- Efficient incentives with social preferences (Q6631802) (← links)