The following pages link to Drew Fudenberg (Q253688):
Displaying 50 items.
- Game theory (Q2816007) (← links)
- Timing and self-control (Q2859050) (← links)
- Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium (Q2962266) (← links)
- Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown (Q3057836) (← links)
- Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation (Q3101747) (← links)
- Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts (Q3352807) (← links)
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (Q3468907) (← links)
- (Q3639770) (← links)
- (Q3639771) (← links)
- (Q3639772) (← links)
- (Q3639773) (← links)
- (Q3639774) (← links)
- (Q3639775) (← links)
- (Q3639776) (← links)
- (Q3639777) (← links)
- (Q3639778) (← links)
- (Q3639780) (← links)
- (Q3639781) (← links)
- (Q3639782) (← links)
- (Q3639783) (← links)
- (Q3639784) (← links)
- (Q3639785) (← links)
- (Q3639786) (← links)
- Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology (Q3682196) (← links)
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly (Q3730304) (← links)
- Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents (Q3765522) (← links)
- (Q3999004) (← links)
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (Q4008555) (← links)
- (Q4223194) (← links)
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information (Q4316532) (← links)
- Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? (Q4453714) (← links)
- Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (Q4586018) (← links)
- Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion (Q4614273) (← links)
- Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility (Q4614321) (← links)
- Bayesian posteriors for arbitrarily rare events (Q4646121) (← links)
- Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games (Q4682707) (← links)
- Active learning with a misspecified prior (Q4682788) (← links)
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (Q4724442) (← links)
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information (Q4747943) (← links)
- Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning (Q4834705) (← links)
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent (Q4883109) (← links)
- Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations* (Q4962988) (← links)
- Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory (Q5240436) (← links)
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium (Q5287205) (← links)
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium (Q5287206) (← links)
- Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players (Q5749170) (← links)
- Repeated Games with Frequent Signals<sup>*</sup> (Q5850901) (← links)
- Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning (Q5860130) (← links)
- Which misspecifications persist? (Q6076925) (← links)
- On concave functions over lotteries (Q6146459) (← links)
