Pages that link to "Item:Q5904119"
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The following pages link to College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (Q5904119):
Displaying 50 items.
- The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges (Q783028) (← links)
- Weakening transferable utility: the case of non-intersecting Pareto curves (Q785518) (← links)
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information (Q785531) (← links)
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets (Q785541) (← links)
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities (Q788605) (← links)
- The 'marriage game': An assignment problem with indivisibilities (Q791450) (← links)
- A parallel algorithm to solve the stable marriage problem (Q798000) (← links)
- Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings (Q798345) (← links)
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem (Q800200) (← links)
- Characterization of cores of assignment games (Q805509) (← links)
- A unifying approach to the structures of the stable matching problems (Q808729) (← links)
- Stable outcomes for two-sided contract choice problems (Q812399) (← links)
- Pairwise kidney exchange (Q813943) (← links)
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games (Q815216) (← links)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
- Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets (Q826612) (← links)
- Sports scheduling and other topics in sports analytics: a survey with special reference to Latin America (Q828758) (← links)
- The complexity of the certification of properties of stable marriage (Q834962) (← links)
- Subcritical regimes in some models of continuum percolation (Q835060) (← links)
- Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket (Q836923) (← links)
- Poisson matching (Q838317) (← links)
- Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
- Hardness results on the man-exchange stable marriage problem with short preference lists (Q845882) (← links)
- Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective (Q847807) (← links)
- Two-sided matching with interdependent values (Q848607) (← links)
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q848608) (← links)
- A stable marriage of Poisson and Lebesgue (Q850966) (← links)
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (Q864893) (← links)
- The manipulability of matching rules via segmentation (Q868616) (← links)
- Consistent house allocation (Q868626) (← links)
- A surgical scheduling method considering surgeons' preferences (Q887894) (← links)
- Independent random partial matching with general types (Q890137) (← links)
- Generalized matchings for preferences represented by simplest semiorder: stability and Pareto optimality (Q891210) (← links)
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games (Q891334) (← links)
- Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems (Q892977) (← links)
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search (Q893408) (← links)
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems (Q894006) (← links)
- Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
- Improved approximation algorithms for two variants of the stable marriage problem with ties (Q896290) (← links)
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values (Q896937) (← links)
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (Q896943) (← links)
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions (Q898694) (← links)
- Congestion games with capacitated resources (Q904685) (← links)
- Friend of my friend: network formation with two-hop benefit (Q904688) (← links)
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory (Q908176) (← links)
- A survey on assignment markets (Q908179) (← links)
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem (Q908181) (← links)
- A deferred acceptance algorithm with contracts (Q908183) (← links)
- Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)