The following pages link to On cores and indivisibility (Q1843369):
Displaying 50 items.
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Q5932333) (← links)
- A new solution to the random assignment problem. (Q5958895) (← links)
- House allocation with transfers (Q5958896) (← links)
- Hardness results for stable exchange problems (Q5965780) (← links)
- matchingMarkets (Q5983273) (← links)
- Atomic cross-chain swaps with improved space, time and local time complexities (Q6044465) (← links)
- Stable and extremely unequal (Q6047334) (← links)
- On reachable assignments under dichotomous preferences (Q6057838) (← links)
- Equilibrium in a civilized jungle (Q6059535) (← links)
- The core for housing markets with limited externalities (Q6063088) (← links)
- Empirical content of classic assignment methods: jungle and market economy (Q6063089) (← links)
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core (Q6063093) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms (Q6074836) (← links)
- Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems (Q6074889) (← links)
- The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants (Q6074890) (← links)
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (Q6076910) (← links)
- All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof (Q6076917) (← links)
- The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games (Q6088194) (← links)
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation (Q6090447) (← links)
- Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences (Q6102576) (← links)
- Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof (Q6117767) (← links)
- On two mechanisms in job rotation problems (Q6121898) (← links)
- Non-vetoed matching with status quo (Q6121906) (← links)
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf (Q6121908) (← links)
- Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange (Q6125932) (← links)
- Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values (Q6136264) (← links)
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints (Q6145529) (← links)
- School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
- Stability of an allocation of objects (Q6156320) (← links)
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources (Q6156321) (← links)
- A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule (Q6156333) (← links)
- Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem (Q6167384) (← links)
- Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice (Q6168800) (← links)
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights (Q6168805) (← links)
- On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015) (Q6168806) (← links)
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles (Q6176732) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities (Q6188682) (← links)
- Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences (Q6188684) (← links)
- Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts (Q6203356) (← links)
- A Lattice Linear Predicate Parallel Algorithm for the Housing Market Problem (Q6488434) (← links)
- Atomic cross-chain swaps with improved space and local time complexity (Q6536334) (← links)
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design (Q6536583) (← links)
- The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization (Q6541989) (← links)
- The core of school choice problems (Q6559104) (← links)
- Top trading cycles (Q6559462) (← links)
- A logical description of priority separable games (Q6562527) (← links)
- On Pareto optimal balanced exchanges (Q6564189) (← links)
- Efficient matching under general constraints (Q6565039) (← links)
- Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains (Q6565042) (← links)
