The following pages link to Journal of Economic Theory (Q61265):
Displaying 50 items.
- Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability (Q996393) (← links)
- Representing roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities (Q996394) (← links)
- More strategies, more Nash equilibria (Q996395) (← links)
- Good news and bad news in two-armed bandits (Q996396) (← links)
- A note on recursive multiple-priors (Q996397) (← links)
- Brown's original fictitious play (Q996398) (← links)
- Ordering infinite utility streams (Q996399) (← links)
- Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions (Q996400) (← links)
- Erratum to ``Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency'': [Journal of economic theory 111 (2003) 88--109] (Q996401) (← links)
- Dynamic psychological games (Q1001812) (← links)
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition (Q1001814) (← links)
- Mechanism design with collusive supervision (Q1001815) (← links)
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects (Q1001816) (← links)
- Folk theorem with communication (Q1001817) (← links)
- Afriat's theorem for general budget sets (Q1001818) (← links)
- Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters (Q1001819) (← links)
- Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation (Q1001821) (← links)
- Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium (Q1001822) (← links)
- Bayesian coalitional rationalizability (Q1001823) (← links)
- Redistributive politics with distortionary taxation (Q1001825) (← links)
- Optimal growth and uncertainty: Learning (Q1001826) (← links)
- Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria (Q1001828) (← links)
- Repeated games with one-memory (Q1001829) (← links)
- Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty (Q1001830) (← links)
- Finite additive utility representations for preferences over menus (Q1001831) (← links)
- An axiomatic theory of political representation (Q1001832) (← links)
- The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle (Q1001833) (← links)
- Global Newton method for stochastic games (Q1001834) (← links)
- Structural holes in social networks: A remark (Q1001835) (← links)
- Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty (Q1001836) (← links)
- Directed search with multiple job applications (Q1007316) (← links)
- Debt and deficit fluctuations and the structure of bond markets (Q1007318) (← links)
- Sequential contracting with multiple principals (Q1007319) (← links)
- Portfolio choice and pricing in illiquid markets (Q1007320) (← links)
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions (Q1007321) (← links)
- Selecting equilibria in common agency games (Q1007323) (← links)
- Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks (Q1007324) (← links)
- Theories of coalitional rationality (Q1007326) (← links)
- The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure (Q1007327) (← links)
- Correlated Nash equilibrium (Q1007328) (← links)
- Pivots versus signals in elections (Q1007329) (← links)
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? (Q1007330) (← links)
- A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games (Q1007331) (← links)
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Q1007332) (← links)
- Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem (Q1007334) (← links)
- Decreasing impatience and the magnitude effect jointly contradict exponential discounting (Q1007335) (← links)
- From posteriors to priors via cycles (Q1007336) (← links)
- The role of optimal threats in auction design (Q1007337) (← links)
- A theory of subjective compound lotteries (Q1017776) (← links)
- Recursive smooth ambiguity preferences (Q1017777) (← links)
