Pages that link to "Item:Q1079121"

The following pages link to Some remarks on the stable matching problem (Q1079121):

Displaying 50 items.

• The hospitals/residents problem with lower quotas (Q261379) (← links)
• Enrollment manipulations in school choice (Q268634) (← links)
• The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q309845) (← links)
• A branch-and-price algorithm for stable workforce assignments with hierarchical skills (Q322747) (← links)
• Improved algorithmic results for unsplittable stable allocation problems (Q326457) (← links)
• Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems (Q346530) (← links)
• Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
• The substitutes condition and the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations (Q406268) (← links)
• Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search (Q456691) (← links)
• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' (Q462856) (← links)
• When do stable roommate matchings exist? A review (Q483587) (← links)
• Optimal truncation in matching markets (Q485816) (← links)
• Stable marriage with general preferences (Q506532) (← links)
• Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (Q521881) (← links)
• The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (Q523460) (← links)
• Sex-equal stable matchings: complexity and exact algorithms (Q528851) (← links)
• A 25/17-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem with one-sided ties (Q528863) (← links)
• Decentralized job matching (Q532508) (← links)
• Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion (Q532764) (← links)
• The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model (Q617603) (← links)
• The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences (Q637586) (← links)
• A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
• Group robust stability in matching markets (Q665110) (← links)
• Restabilizing matching markets at senior level (Q705941) (← links)
• Stable multi-skill workforce assignments (Q744637) (← links)
• Stable outcomes for two-sided contract choice problems (Q812399) (← links)
• Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
• The manipulability of matching rules via segmentation (Q868616) (← links)
• Improved approximation algorithms for two variants of the stable marriage problem with ties (Q896290) (← links)
• On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory (Q908176) (← links)
• Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
• Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
• On the invariance of male optimal stable matching (Q922701) (← links)
• Two algorithms for the student-project allocation problem (Q924544) (← links)
• Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market (Q926792) (← links)
• A \((2-c\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}})\)-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem (Q930600) (← links)
• A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting (Q930917) (← links)
• Size versus stability in the marriage problem (Q964402) (← links)
• The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135) (← links)
• Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples (Q975759) (← links)
• The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas (Q986550) (← links)
• An improved approximation lower bound for finding almost stable maximum matchings (Q989570) (← links)
• The stable marriage problem with master preference lists (Q1005239) (← links)
• Stable matching problems with exchange restrictions (Q1016052) (← links)
• Stable marriage with ties and bounded length preference lists (Q1026229) (← links)
• Approximation algorithms for hard variants of the stable marriage and hospitals/residents problems (Q1029707) (← links)
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q1036602) (← links)
• A further note on the stable matching problem (Q1082352) (← links)
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences (Q1191821) (← links)
• Double-edged population monotonicity of Walrasian equilibrium -- a note on the nature of competition (Q1296495) (← links)