Pages that link to "Item:Q1077313"
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The following pages link to The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (Q1077313):
Displaying 50 items.
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice (Q268634) (← links)
- Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas (Q274410) (← links)
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice (Q290161) (← links)
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q309845) (← links)
- Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept (Q328575) (← links)
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
- An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement (Q386062) (← links)
- Application fee manipulations in matching markets (Q393269) (← links)
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems (Q403704) (← links)
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (Q404743) (← links)
- Profit-maximizing matchmaker (Q417692) (← links)
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' (Q462856) (← links)
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences (Q477355) (← links)
- Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems (Q477777) (← links)
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776) (← links)
- Optimal truncation in matching markets (Q485816) (← links)
- A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings (Q489140) (← links)
- Stability and strategy-proofness for college admissions with an eligibility criterion (Q490945) (← links)
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences (Q500490) (← links)
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (Q508390) (← links)
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems (Q521881) (← links)
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (Q523460) (← links)
- Decentralized job matching (Q532508) (← links)
- The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model (Q617603) (← links)
- Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness (Q647541) (← links)
- A further note on the college admission game (Q662278) (← links)
- Group robust stability in matching markets (Q665110) (← links)
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (Q708883) (← links)
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples (Q708931) (← links)
- Pairwise kidney exchange (Q813943) (← links)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
- Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket (Q836923) (← links)
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (Q864893) (← links)
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods (Q866940) (← links)
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems (Q894006) (← links)
- Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
- Congestion games with capacitated resources (Q904685) (← links)
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (Q908186) (← links)
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP) (Q972135) (← links)
- Manipulation via capacities revisited (Q980957) (← links)
- An impossibility theorem for matching problems (Q989977) (← links)
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (Q1031836) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q1036602) (← links)
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets (Q1110430) (← links)
- Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope (Q1190600) (← links)
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences (Q1191821) (← links)
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement (Q1283855) (← links)
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? (Q1294009) (← links)
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem (Q1303882) (← links)
