Pages that link to "Item:Q1189670"

The following pages link to Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information (Q1189670):

Displaying 38 items.

• Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers (Q320139) (← links)
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective (Q320681) (← links)
• Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case (Q431221) (← links)
• Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium (Q503042) (← links)
• Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions (Q523528) (← links)
• Asymmetric auctions with resale: an experimental study (Q629339) (← links)
• First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge (Q862751) (← links)
• Pre-auction offers in asymmetric first-price and second-price auctions (Q926888) (← links)
• Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria (Q1001828) (← links)
• Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions (Q1039728) (← links)
• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information (Q1119188) (← links)
• Computationally convenient distributional assumptions for common-value auctions (Q1273457) (← links)
• On ring formation in auctions (Q1278563) (← links)
• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. (Q1421904) (← links)
• Set of Nash-type equilibria in auction-type games (Q1422813) (← links)
• Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence. (Q1852669) (← links)
• Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs (Q1927337) (← links)
• Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions! (Q1934150) (← links)
• Analytical solution of \(k\)th price auction (Q2021831) (← links)
• A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders (Q2098997) (← links)
• Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism (Q2105701) (← links)
• First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model (Q2268137) (← links)
• Asymmetric first price auctions (Q2271373) (← links)
• Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study (Q2276557) (← links)
• Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule (Q2288522) (← links)
• Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction (Q2295815) (← links)
• Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions (Q2329699) (← links)
• All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction (Q2389300) (← links)
• Ranking asymmetric auctions (Q2453493) (← links)
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions (Q2482919) (← links)
• Multidimensional private value auctions (Q2490121) (← links)
• Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions (Q2690844) (← links)
• The theoretic results on sealed bids imitated by distributions \(\Delta (a,b;c)\) (Q2761958) (← links)
• Stationary state in a multistage auction model (Q2827135) (← links)
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations (Q2867516) (← links)
• Nash Equilibria in a Sealed Bid Auction (Q4114979) (← links)
• Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions (Q5868915) (← links)
• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions (Q5885597) (← links)