Pages that link to "Item:Q1191821"

The following pages link to Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences (Q1191821):

Displaying 40 items.

• Group stability in matching with interdependent values (Q490943) (← links)
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information (Q508409) (← links)
• Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty (Q521877) (← links)
• Coarse matching with incomplete information (Q535167) (← links)
• Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange (Q665102) (← links)
• In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm (Q705854) (← links)
• The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges (Q783028) (← links)
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values (Q848607) (← links)
• Matching markets under (in)complete information (Q894021) (← links)
• A note on job matching with budget constraints (Q899816) (← links)
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms (Q952781) (← links)
• Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms (Q1338121) (← links)
• The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game. (Q1431786) (← links)
• Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents (Q1626247) (← links)
• Protective behavior in matching models (Q1804637) (← links)
• An advanced parking navigation system for downtown parking (Q2005880) (← links)
• Three-sided matching problem with mixed preferences (Q2060065) (← links)
• Decision-making with reference information (Q2154380) (← links)
• Matching strategies of heterogeneous agents under incomplete information in a university clearinghouse (Q2173416) (← links)
• On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information (Q2178025) (← links)
• Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information (Q2268125) (← links)
• Self-selection in school choice (Q2273935) (← links)
• Synchronized matching with incomplete information (Q2323604) (← links)
• A dynamic school choice model (Q2435894) (← links)
• Disclosure of information in matching markets with non-transferable utility (Q2437811) (← links)
• Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets (Q2453416) (← links)
• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets (Q2455677) (← links)
• Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences (Q2482672) (← links)
• Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms (Q2682797) (← links)
• Lazy Gale-Shapley for many-to-one matching with partial information (Q2695460) (← links)
• The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments (Q3460776) (← links)
• (Q3461518) (← links)
• (Q4624035) (← links)
• Tradeoffs between information and ordinal approximation for bipartite matching (Q5894698) (← links)
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning (Q6059561) (← links)
• Lexicographically maximal edges of dual hypergraphs and Nash-solvability of tight game forms (Q6150959) (← links)
• Unique stable matchings (Q6176757) (← links)
• Bayesian stable states (Q6565036) (← links)
• Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets (Q6584584) (← links)
• An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities (Q6623770) (← links)