Pages that link to "Item:Q1220875"

The following pages link to The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences (Q1220875):

Displaying 19 items.

• Computational complexity in the design of voting rules (Q256771) (← links)
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences (Q754097) (← links)
• A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games (Q957863) (← links)
• A stability index for local effectivity functions (Q975939) (← links)
• From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences (Q1065691) (← links)
• Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives (Q1106744) (← links)
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule (Q1151327) (← links)
• The strategy-proof social choice functions (Q1151329) (← links)
• Single-peaked orders on a tree (Q1169916) (← links)
• Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium (Q1171972) (← links)
• Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem (Q1176220) (← links)
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory (Q1227673) (← links)
• A further result on the core of voting games (Q1242821) (← links)
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions (Q1251576) (← links)
• The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy (Q1254933) (← links)
• Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems (Q2453823) (← links)
• The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union (Q2500721) (← links)
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions (Q2852562) (← links)
• Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games (Q6121899) (← links)