Pages that link to "Item:Q1293747"

The following pages link to Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer (Q1293747):

Displaying 16 items.

• Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons (Q926327) (← links)
• Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies (Q938058) (← links)
• Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations (Q999738) (← links)
• Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer (Q1021613) (← links)
• A solution to the problem of consumption externalities. (Q1415908) (← links)
• Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations (Q1590140) (← links)
• Nash implementation in production economies (Q1893788) (← links)
• Incentive compatibility under ambiguity (Q2143904) (← links)
• Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale (Q2268909) (← links)
• Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization (Q2325647) (← links)
• Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills (Q2384716) (← links)
• A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies (Q2388771) (← links)
• Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments (Q2432489) (← links)
• Implementation in production economies with increasing returns (Q2486164) (← links)
• Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents (Q3141205) (← links)
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism (Q3468841) (← links)