Pages that link to "Item:Q1331066"

The following pages link to The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences (Q1331066):

Displaying 27 items.

• The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes (Q459405) (← links)
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810) (← links)
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition (Q862542) (← links)
• The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule (Q899999) (← links)
• Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs (Q952695) (← links)
• Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour (Q1042332) (← links)
• The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections (Q1278562) (← links)
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation (Q1680740) (← links)
• Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing (Q1786787) (← links)
• Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (Q1814942) (← links)
• Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
• Strategic voting and nomination (Q2247944) (← links)
• Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences (Q2346947) (← links)
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127) (← links)
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules (Q2391056) (← links)
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory (Q2426958) (← links)
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505) (← links)
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules (Q2450082) (← links)
• Robustness against inefficient manipulation (Q2460084) (← links)
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis (Q2463576) (← links)
• Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems (Q2464017) (← links)
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization (Q2500712) (← links)
• Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules (Q5053691) (← links)
• Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation (Q5053694) (← links)
• Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (Q5053696) (← links)
• IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report (Q5053701) (← links)
• Statistical evaluation of voting rules (Q5964648) (← links)