Pages that link to "Item:Q1338087"

The following pages link to Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection (Q1338087):

Displaying 39 items.

• Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? (Q776858) (← links)
• Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection (Q779104) (← links)
• Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: Incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints (Q1300369) (← links)
• Existence of optimal auctions in general environments (Q1300508) (← links)
• Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard (Q1317328) (← links)
• Dominant strategy mechanisms for contract auctions with risk aversion and moral hazard (Q1322441) (← links)
• Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard (Q1338081) (← links)
• On the continuity of expected utility (Q1341462) (← links)
• Characterization of a class of moral-hazard, adverse selection games (Q1351250) (← links)
• Optimal contracting of separable production technologies (Q1378012) (← links)
• Bidding for incentive contracts (Q1633664) (← links)
• Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse selection and moral hazard are present (Q1640935) (← links)
• The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent (Q1651880) (← links)
• A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system (Q1694340) (← links)
• Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents (Q1759094) (← links)
• Nonparametric adverse selection problems (Q1854738) (← links)
• On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models (Q1916287) (← links)
• On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility (Q1925675) (← links)
• Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents (Q1927310) (← links)
• Optimal and robust contracts for a risk-constrained principal (Q1932523) (← links)
• Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions (Q1996108) (← links)
• Robust contracting in general contract spaces (Q2143885) (← links)
• A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard (Q2154354) (← links)
• Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions (Q2178586) (← links)
• Optimizing maintenance service contracts through mechanism design theory (Q2293743) (← links)
• Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection (Q2302840) (← links)
• An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard (Q2411164) (← links)
• Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard (Q2434231) (← links)
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints (Q2466858) (← links)
• Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems (Q2581789) (← links)
• Optimal contract for the principal-agent under Knightian uncertainty (Q2656889) (← links)
• Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Compensation Contracts (Q3098301) (← links)
• Threat-based incentive mechanisms under moral hazard and adverse selection (Q3991529) (← links)
• Monotonicity of Optimal Contracts Without the First-Order Approach (Q4971397) (← links)
• (Q5455603) (← links)
• Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection (Q5944739) (← links)
• Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard (Q6059551) (← links)
• The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems (Q6074831) (← links)
• Optimal stopping contract for public private partnerships under moral hazard (Q6105371) (← links)