Pages that link to "Item:Q1408644"

The following pages link to Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: Chopsticks and tetrahedra. (Q1408644):

Displaying 25 items.

• An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction (Q406416) (← links)
• All-pay \(2\times 2\) Hex: a multibattle contest with complementarities (Q495755) (← links)
• Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions (Q523500) (← links)
• A simple mechanism for resolving conflict (Q608541) (← links)
• Quantization and experimental realization of the Colonel Blotto game (Q669813) (← links)
• The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game (Q690683) (← links)
• Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games (Q825164) (← links)
• Designing competitions between teams of individuals (Q991017) (← links)
• Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints (Q1003098) (← links)
• A Blotto game with incomplete information (Q1046264) (← links)
• Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games. (Q1416496) (← links)
• \(N\)-dimensional Blotto game with heterogeneous battlefield values (Q1640579) (← links)
• Equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem (Q1774813) (← links)
• Buying supermajorities in the lab (Q2031176) (← links)
• Strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players (Q2164963) (← links)
• Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria (Q2256865) (← links)
• On monotone strategy equilibria in simultaneous auctions for complementary goods (Q2283142) (← links)
• A theory of perceived discrimination (Q2376990) (← links)
• Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities (Q2399677) (← links)
• Contests with limited resources (Q2455686) (← links)
• Introduction to the special issue on contests (Q2677726) (← links)
• A ``fractal'' solution to the chopstick auction (Q2677727) (← links)
• Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction (Q2689420) (← links)
• TWO-OBJECT TWO-BIDDER SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS (Q3502892) (← links)
• A Bayesian equilibrium for simultaneous first-price auctions for complementary goods and quasi-linear bids (Q6107325) (← links)