Pages that link to "Item:Q1572945"
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The following pages link to On monitoring and collusion in hierarchies (Q1572945):
Displaying 15 items.
- Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories (Q926882) (← links)
- Mechanism design with collusive supervision (Q1001815) (← links)
- Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence (Q1017787) (← links)
- The not-so-secret-agent: professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation. (Q1862638) (← links)
- Supervisory information and loss aversion (Q2036997) (← links)
- Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations (Q2211471) (← links)
- Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword (Q2211493) (← links)
- Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy (Q2667268) (← links)
- Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion (Q2685873) (← links)
- Monitoring the market or the salesperson? The value of information in a multilayer supply chain (Q2892134) (← links)
- Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information (Q3044078) (← links)
- GRANTING AN EXIT OPTION TO CONDUCT AN AUDIT (Q3096865) (← links)
- Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship (Q4256245) (← links)
- Reciprocal Supervision, Collusion and Organizational Design (Q4256247) (← links)
- Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship (Q4368684) (← links)