The following pages link to Dominique Lepelley (Q166322):
Displaying 43 items.
- A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser (Q274071) (← links)
- Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule (Q298362) (← links)
- The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes (Q459405) (← links)
- On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members (Q535276) (← links)
- Three ways to compute accurately the probability of the referendum paradox (Q554497) (← links)
- Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules. (Q628561) (← links)
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule (Q899999) (← links)
- On the probability of observing Borda's paradox (Q976964) (← links)
- The unexpected behavior of plurality rule (Q1036103) (← links)
- The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections (Q1278562) (← links)
- The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser (Q1300394) (← links)
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences (Q1331066) (← links)
- Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition (Q1389748) (← links)
- The probability of conflicts in a U. S. presidential type election (Q1424208) (← links)
- (Q1575377) (redirect page) (← links)
- Strong Condorcet efficiency of scoring rules (Q1575378) (← links)
- The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner (Q1606439) (← links)
- The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting (Q1697837) (← links)
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules (Q1707108) (← links)
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation. (Q1811244) (← links)
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (Q1814942) (← links)
- On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences (Q2158613) (← links)
- The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system (Q2179470) (← links)
- Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation (Q2276853) (← links)
- Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections (Q2300612) (← links)
- Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes (Q2315452) (← links)
- On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser (Q2366194) (← links)
- Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition (Q2386326) (← links)
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory (Q2426958) (← links)
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505) (← links)
- Book review of: Jean-François Laslier and M. Remzi Sanver (eds.), Handbook on approval voting (Q2452249) (← links)
- On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games (Q2453422) (← links)
- Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election? (Q2629520) (← links)
- (Q3626677) (← links)
- Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple (Q4033526) (← links)
- Regles positionnelles iteratives, principe majoritaire et preferences unimodales (Q4528239) (← links)
- On probability models in voting theory (Q4850103) (← links)
- (Q4878468) (← links)
- Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions (Q5053685) (← links)
- Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union (Q5053692) (← links)
- Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates (Q5927694) (← links)
- The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters (Q5932216) (← links)
- Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity (Q5948903) (← links)
