The following pages link to Bettina Klaus (Q167684):
Displaying 50 items.
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics (Q290170) (← links)
- Local and global consistency properties for student placement (Q386062) (← links)
- A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems (Q433811) (← links)
- A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets (Q533919) (← links)
- Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets (Q536089) (← links)
- Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems'' (Q548066) (← links)
- Farsighted house allocation (Q617588) (← links)
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets (Q617674) (← links)
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (Q708883) (← links)
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples (Q708931) (← links)
- Solidarity for public goods under single-peaked preferences: characterizing target set correspondences (Q826606) (← links)
- Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples'' (Q840696) (← links)
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (Q864893) (← links)
- Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods (Q866940) (← links)
- Consistent house allocation (Q868626) (← links)
- Stochastic stability in assignment problems (Q899503) (← links)
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem (Q908181) (← links)
- The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible (Q932763) (← links)
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts (Q1030169) (← links)
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts (Q1031836) (← links)
- ``Fair marriages'': an impossibility (Q1046258) (← links)
- Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good (Q1365370) (← links)
- Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped (Q1390979) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems (Q1414412) (← links)
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670) (← links)
- Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites (Q1662656) (← links)
- Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists (Q1668286) (← links)
- Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems (Q1767476) (← links)
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples (Q1772667) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (Q1867775) (← links)
- Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules (Q1880359) (← links)
- Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods (Q1929448) (← links)
- Consistency in one-sided assignment problems (Q1959691) (← links)
- Consistency and its converse for roommate markets (Q2013333) (← links)
- Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: equilibria versus stability (Q2013343) (← links)
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals (Q2021810) (← links)
- How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field (Q2049478) (← links)
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects (Q2058845) (← links)
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices (Q2206002) (← links)
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts (Q2325654) (← links)
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants (Q2334138) (← links)
- Corrigendum to ``On randomized matching mechanisms'' [Econ. Theory 8 (1996) 377--381] (Q2373372) (← links)
- Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments (Q2386274) (← links)
- Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities (Q2398189) (← links)
- A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences (Q2432495) (← links)
- The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness (Q2452137) (← links)
- Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and roommate markets (Q2453399) (← links)
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples (Q2458423) (← links)
- Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) (Q2463787) (← links)
- Median stable matching for college admissions (Q2491093) (← links)
