Pages that link to "Item:Q1757600"
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The following pages link to College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized (Q1757600):
Displaying 16 items.
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission (Q523008) (← links)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
- College assignment as a large contest (Q1753683) (← links)
- A college admissions clearinghouse (Q1757598) (← links)
- Financial aid and early admissions at selective need-blind colleges (Q2093043) (← links)
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion (Q2099060) (← links)
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions (Q2206795) (← links)
- Rational students and resit exams (Q2444193) (← links)
- Simultaneous screening and college admissions (Q2512356) (← links)
- Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem (Q4610673) (← links)
- (Q5053286) (← links)
- Parallel Innovation Contests (Q5095155) (← links)
- The exam location problem: mathematical formulations and variants (Q6065634) (← links)
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (Q6076910) (← links)
- Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based (Q6168831) (← links)
- School choice with independent versus consolidated districts (Q6634115) (← links)