Pages that link to "Item:Q1762858"
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The following pages link to Stability and voting by committees with exit (Q1762858):
Displaying 16 items.
- Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences (Q325026) (← links)
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency (Q683523) (← links)
- Candidate stability and voting correspondences (Q857970) (← links)
- Voting for voters: the unanimity case (Q1414442) (← links)
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness (Q1704055) (← links)
- Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model (Q2013360) (← links)
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (Q2248911) (← links)
- Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains (Q2340261) (← links)
- On stable rules for selecting committees (Q2358564) (← links)
- Simple collective identity functions (Q2380519) (← links)
- Procedural group identification (Q2384875) (← links)
- An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit (Q2384877) (← links)
- On exiting after voting (Q2491086) (← links)
- Unanimity and resource monotonicity (Q2502389) (← links)
- The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core (Q2511260) (← links)
- Core-stable committees under restricted domains (Q6167258) (← links)
