Pages that link to "Item:Q1863926"

The following pages link to Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences (Q1863926):

Displaying 32 items.

• Complexities of electing diverse committees (Q483536) (← links)
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC? (Q816096) (← links)
• Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: the relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidates (Q862742) (← links)
• Signal extraction for simulated games with a large number of players (Q959331) (← links)
• Random preorders and alignments (Q960973) (← links)
• On the probability of observing Borda's paradox (Q976964) (← links)
• On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (Q993505) (← links)
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas (Q995675) (← links)
• The probability of a Condorcet winner with a small number of voters (Q1128929) (← links)
• Condorcet's paradox under the maximal culture condition (Q1389748) (← links)
• The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist. (Q1420529) (← links)
• The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting (Q1697837) (← links)
• On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences (Q1704048) (← links)
• The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes (Q1763193) (← links)
• The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen's paradox (Q2081898) (← links)
• The probability of intransitivity in dice and close elections (Q2210747) (← links)
• Voting-based ensemble learning for partial lexicographic preference forests over combinatorial domains (Q2278102) (← links)
• Confidence and varieties of bias (Q2332825) (← links)
• The probability of the paradox of voting for weak preference orderings (Q2386309) (← links)
• Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society (Q2388756) (← links)
• Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice (Q2436696) (← links)
• Robustness against inefficient manipulation (Q2460084) (← links)
• Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis (Q2463576) (← links)
• The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences (Q2500750) (← links)
• On the likelihood of Condorcet's profiles (Q2567908) (← links)
• The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles (Q2568842) (← links)
• An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes (Q2667570) (← links)
• Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox (Q5053688) (← links)
• Similarity Suppresses Cyclicity: Why Similar Competitors Form Hierarchies (Q6086808) (← links)
• Population of entities with three individual states and asymmetric interactions (Q6090297) (← links)
• How to choose a president, mayor, chair: Balinski and Laraki unpacked (Q6169256) (← links)
• When ties are possible: weak Condorcet winners and Arrovian rationality (Q6173748) (← links)