Pages that link to "Item:Q1863937"
From MaRDI portal
The following pages link to On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules (Q1863937):
Displaying 18 items.
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Q452827) (← links)
- Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions (Q997202) (← links)
- A note on asymptotical strategy-proofness (Q1676634) (← links)
- On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences (Q1704048) (← links)
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations (Q1735752) (← links)
- The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules (Q1811251) (← links)
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? (Q1887542) (← links)
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis (Q2256718) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity (Q2385061) (← links)
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127) (← links)
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505) (← links)
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey (Q2436695) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies: the case of weak orders (Q2452263) (← links)
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election (Q2500745) (← links)
- On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules (Q2567915) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship (Q2641999) (← links)
- (Q5018516) (← links)
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions (Q5022149) (← links)
