The following pages link to Balanced Bayesian mechanisms (Q1876661):
Displaying 13 items.
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations (Q405757) (← links)
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452) (← links)
- Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (Q928879) (← links)
- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types (Q1014325) (← links)
- Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance (Q1268597) (← links)
- A note on Matsushima's regularity condition (Q1806208) (← links)
- Balanced implementability of sequencing rules (Q2278931) (← links)
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces (Q2324797) (← links)
- Optimal crowdfunding design (Q2334128) (← links)
- Mechanism design with information acquisition (Q2358793) (← links)
- Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance (Q2370489) (← links)
- Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design (Q5111103) (← links)
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction (Q6565044) (← links)
