Pages that link to "Item:Q1877157"

The following pages link to The relevance of private information in mechanism design (Q1877157):

Displaying 42 items.

• The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: theory and experimental evidence (Q516968) (← links)
• Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design (Q523002) (← links)
• The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency? (Q553895) (← links)
• Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents (Q617679) (← links)
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction (Q617680) (← links)
• Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity (Q629333) (← links)
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure (Q633787) (← links)
• Comment on ``Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents'' [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210-217] (Q643288) (← links)
• Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452) (← links)
• Locally robust implementation and its limits (Q694745) (← links)
• When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? (Q725041) (← links)
• Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction (Q878397) (← links)
• Private information and the `Information function': A survey of possible uses (Q928753) (← links)
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus (Q928879) (← links)
• Ex post implementation (Q932807) (← links)
• Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game (Q943345) (← links)
• Competitive experimentation with private information: the survivor's curse (Q969122) (← links)
• Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible (Q996382) (← links)
• Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game (Q1046116) (← links)
• On the types of information and mechanism design (Q1114567) (← links)
• The effectiveness of English auctions. (Q1399514) (← links)
• Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide (Q1650274) (← links)
• Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs (Q1934074) (← links)
• Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction (Q2067386) (← links)
• Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces (Q2324797) (← links)
• Mechanism design with information acquisition (Q2358793) (← links)
• The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces (Q2359394) (← links)
• Impact of higher-order uncertainty (Q2384440) (← links)
• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents (Q2386136) (← links)
• Surplus extraction with rich type spaces (Q2434246) (← links)
• Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs (Q2444696) (← links)
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations (Q2455672) (← links)
• Multidimensional private value auctions (Q2490121) (← links)
• Public goods with congestion (Q2496791) (← links)
• (Q3332705) (← links)
• Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case (Q3354437) (← links)
• (Q3594546) (← links)
• Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values (Q4586109) (← links)
• (Q5312468) (← links)
• Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design (Q6160142) (← links)
• Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge (Q6163291) (← links)
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction (Q6565044) (← links)