Pages that link to "Item:Q1927736"
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The following pages link to Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem (Q1927736):
Displaying 16 items.
- An analysis of the German university admissions system (Q361830) (← links)
- Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets (Q485820) (← links)
- Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games (Q548065) (← links)
- Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search (Q893408) (← links)
- Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems (Q930486) (← links)
- Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability (Q1021616) (← links)
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement (Q1283855) (← links)
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems (Q1577962) (← links)
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm (Q2041080) (← links)
- Gradual college admission (Q2067380) (← links)
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach (Q2077946) (← links)
- Simultaneous screening and college admissions (Q2512356) (← links)
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism (Q2675461) (← links)
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited (Q3821889) (← links)
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)