The following pages link to Pablo Amorós (Q205970):
Displaying 19 items.
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms (Q325031) (← links)
- Picking the winners (Q378331) (← links)
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants (Q531410) (← links)
- The scholarship assignment problem (Q700089) (← links)
- Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation (Q705877) (← links)
- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors (Q1017791) (← links)
- Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity (Q1039561) (← links)
- Efficiency and income redistribution in the single-peaked preferences model with several commodities (Q1292347) (← links)
- Bargaining and waning commitments (Q1929432) (← links)
- Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts (Q1984420) (← links)
- Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition (Q2021827) (← links)
- Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate (Q2158670) (← links)
- Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition (Q2180737) (← links)
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury (Q2329697) (← links)
- Single-peaked preferences with several commodities (Q2567899) (← links)
- Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection (Q5944739) (← links)
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction (Q6080655) (← links)
- Evaluation and strategic manipulation (Q6100481) (← links)
- Nash implementation of supermajority rules (Q6665438) (← links)
