Pages that link to "Item:Q2061119"
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The following pages link to Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice (Q2061119):
Displaying 12 items.
- A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea (Q472219) (← links)
- Coalitions and cliques in the school choice problem (Q499930) (← links)
- A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice (Q1668260) (← links)
- Incompatibility between stability and consistency (Q1672771) (← links)
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak (Q1684126) (← links)
- Epsilon-stability in school choice (Q1697834) (← links)
- Inference on an extended Roy model, with an application to schooling decisions in France (Q2439863) (← links)
- Parallel markets in school choice (Q2673220) (← links)
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings (Q5095181) (← links)
- School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
- The core of school choice problems (Q6559104) (← links)
- Minimal farsighted instability (Q6581886) (← links)