The following pages link to Persuasion with costly precision (Q2074047):
Displaying 22 items.
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender (Q503060) (← links)
- Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion (Q632963) (← links)
- Persuasion under ambiguity (Q829506) (← links)
- Dynamic persuasion (Q1622438) (← links)
- Persuasion and receiver's news (Q1668164) (← links)
- On the value of persuasion by experts (Q1701027) (← links)
- Pivotal persuasion (Q1729672) (← links)
- Ambiguous persuasion (Q1757548) (← links)
- Persuasion under costly learning (Q2034801) (← links)
- Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. Introduction to the special issue on communication and persuasion (Q2074036) (← links)
- Resisting persuasion (Q2074039) (← links)
- Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment (Q2074041) (← links)
- Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences (Q2074044) (← links)
- Experimental design to persuade (Q2343397) (← links)
- Persuasion with communication costs (Q2516228) (← links)
- Waiting to Persuade (Q4469709) (← links)
- EFFECTIVE PERSUASION (Q5420144) (← links)
- Slow persuasion (Q6053650) (← links)
- On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals (Q6063099) (← links)
- A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces (Q6156328) (← links)
- Testing under information manipulation (Q6559108) (← links)
- Signaling under double-crossing preferences: the case of discrete types (Q6615365) (← links)