Pages that link to "Item:Q2128949"
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The following pages link to Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts (Q2128949):
Displaying 12 items.
- The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q309845) (← links)
- Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts (Q523462) (← links)
- A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts (Q766250) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q1036602) (← links)
- Equilibrium and matching under price controls (Q1622357) (← links)
- Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts (Q2036921) (← links)
- Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms (Q2206798) (← links)
- Consistency of the doctor-optimal equilibrium price vector in job-matching markets (Q2231426) (← links)
- Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching (Q2259423) (← links)
- The “rural hospital theorem” revisited (Q4583374) (← links)
- Matching With Complementary Contracts (Q4992150) (← links)
- Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets (Q6107369) (← links)