Pages that link to "Item:Q2138369"
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The following pages link to Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets (Q2138369):
Displaying 16 items.
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets (Q498757) (← links)
- A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets (Q533919) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems (Q700121) (← links)
- The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible (Q932763) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities (Q1322449) (← links)
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions (Q1691348) (← links)
- Matching with single-peaked preferences (Q1729666) (← links)
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities (Q2138371) (← links)
- An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments (Q2294218) (← links)
- Matching with restricted trade (Q2329419) (← links)
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf (Q2569386) (← links)
- Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets (Q2660053) (← links)
- A capacitated house market model with tenant under weak preferences (Q3462912) (← links)
- The Market for Residential Architecture: 19th Century Row Houses in Boston′s South End (Q4398097) (← links)
- A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule (Q6156333) (← links)
- Top trading cycles (Q6559462) (← links)
