Pages that link to "Item:Q2173093"
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The following pages link to On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2173093):
Displaying 14 items.
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (Q1757561) (← links)
- Provision-after-wait with preferences ordered by difference: tighter complexity and better approximation (Q2029277) (← links)
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities (Q2051512) (← links)
- On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms (Q2060531) (← links)
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties (Q2334139) (← links)
- Fair and efficient student placement with couples (Q2458423) (← links)
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems (Q2491032) (← links)
- Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design (Q2672280) (← links)
- On computing Pareto stable assignments (Q2904778) (← links)
- New axioms for top trading cycles (Q6066263) (← links)
- Reallocation with priorities and minimal envy mechanisms (Q6074836) (← links)
- Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey (Q6541997) (← links)
- The core of school choice problems (Q6559104) (← links)
- Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off? (Q6665669) (← links)