Pages that link to "Item:Q2211493"
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The following pages link to Monitoring and competing principals: a double-edged sword (Q2211493):
Displaying 8 items.
- Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories (Q926882) (← links)
- Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting (Q996364) (← links)
- The not-so-secret-agent: professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation. (Q1862638) (← links)
- Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant? (Q1897313) (← links)
- Managerial accountability under yardstick competition (Q2099063) (← links)
- The perils of friendly oversight (Q2675405) (← links)
- Monitoring innovation (Q2675453) (← links)
- Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship (Q4368684) (← links)