Pages that link to "Item:Q2268363"
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The following pages link to Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms (Q2268363):
Displaying 14 items.
- Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction (Q397961) (← links)
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity (Q427512) (← links)
- Modeling profit sharing in combinatorial exchanges by network flows (Q490193) (← links)
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects (Q1001816) (← links)
- Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule (Q1042133) (← links)
- Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects (Q1638035) (← links)
- Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition (Q1642157) (← links)
- A subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing (Q1669102) (← links)
- A simple budget-balanced mechanism (Q1707114) (← links)
- Balanced ranking mechanisms (Q2411515) (← links)
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms (Q2447059) (← links)
- Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads (Q2516237) (← links)
- Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions (Q3116137) (← links)
- Characterization of \textit{maxmed} mechanisms for multiple objects (Q6587049) (← links)