Pages that link to "Item:Q2277345"

The following pages link to On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems (Q2277345):

Displaying 50 items.

• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment (Q402069) (← links)
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods (Q431227) (← links)
• Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule (Q449195) (← links)
• Probabilistic assignment problem with multi-unit demands: a generalization of the serial rule and its characterization (Q462853) (← links)
• Assigning agents to a line (Q485809) (← links)
• Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many markets with ties (Q506537) (← links)
• Evaluating assignment without transfers: a market perspective (Q529775) (← links)
• Popular mixed matchings (Q541674) (← links)
• Bounded unpopularity matchings (Q644804) (← links)
• Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem (Q697847) (← links)
• Transversals, systems of distinct representatives, mechanism design, and matching (Q699978) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems (Q700121) (← links)
• Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model (Q705901) (← links)
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? (Q840694) (← links)
• A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain (Q860356) (← links)
• The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments (Q980972) (← links)
• An impossibility theorem for matching problems (Q989977) (← links)
• Random assignment under weak preferences (Q1021614) (← links)
• The Becker-Brock efficient matching theorem with a supermodular technology defined on an \(n\)-lattice (Q1197636) (← links)
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement (Q1283855) (← links)
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems (Q1341500) (← links)
• Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments. (Q1411037) (← links)
• Consistency in house allocation problems (Q1576474) (← links)
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets (Q1622384) (← links)
• Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach (Q1649093) (← links)
• The object allocation problem with random priorities (Q1651226) (← links)
• Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets (Q1651278) (← links)
• Computational aspects of assigning agents to a line (Q1680103) (← links)
• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment (Q1697833) (← links)
• Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable (Q1729671) (← links)
• Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies (Q1735813) (← links)
• A note on the assignment problem with uniform preferences (Q1785360) (← links)
• House allocation with existing tenants (Q1809490) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems (Q1867775) (← links)
• Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types (Q1929140) (← links)
• Assigning papers to referees (Q1959732) (← links)
• Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem (Q1986600) (← links)
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem (Q1995295) (← links)
• Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints (Q2044984) (← links)
• Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem (Q2059097) (← links)
• On the complexity of fair house allocation (Q2060606) (← links)
• A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching (Q2103007) (← links)
• Decision-making with reference information (Q2154380) (← links)
• Matching and scheduling of student-company-talks for a university it-speed dating event (Q2167666) (← links)
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms (Q2178581) (← links)
• On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model (Q2205990) (← links)
• Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions (Q2206795) (← links)
• Inefficiencies on linking decisions (Q2268896) (← links)
• The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching (Q2291153) (← links)
• When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof? (Q2291174) (← links)