Pages that link to "Item:Q2294296"
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The following pages link to Affirmative action under common school priorities: the top trading cycles mechanism case (Q2294296):
Displaying 11 items.
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice (Q308606) (← links)
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670) (← links)
- Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case (Q1668177) (← links)
- The skipping-down strategy and stability in school choice problems with affirmative action: theory and experiment (Q1753287) (← links)
- Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice (Q1787522) (← links)
- A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice (Q2084017) (← links)
- When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action? (Q2125094) (← links)
- On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action (Q2292744) (← links)
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study (Q2311161) (← links)
- Corrigendum to: ``Affirmative action in school choice: a new solution'' (Q2327849) (← links)
- Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice (Q6168800) (← links)