Pages that link to "Item:Q2302840"
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The following pages link to Bank monitoring incentives under moral hazard and adverse selection (Q2302840):
Displaying 9 items.
- A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives (Q471170) (← links)
- Securitization and optimal retention under moral hazard (Q478121) (← links)
- Optimal securities under adverse selection and moral hazard (Q1026249) (← links)
- Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary (Q1196667) (← links)
- Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats (Q2231404) (← links)
- A continuous-time model of self-protection (Q2697501) (← links)
- Closure Policy when Bank Inspection Can Be Manipulated * (Q4677662) (← links)
- An Adverse Selection Approach to Power Pricing (Q5220189) (← links)
- An exit contract optimization problem (Q6186394) (← links)