Pages that link to "Item:Q2385068"
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The following pages link to On the manipulation of social choice correspondences (Q2385068):
Displaying 16 items.
- Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict (Q688540) (← links)
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment (Q733769) (← links)
- Coalitionally strategy-proof social choice correspondences and the Pareto rule (Q734050) (← links)
- Manipulability of choice aggregations (Q1206335) (← links)
- On two new social choice correspondences. (Q1420528) (← links)
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness (Q1651219) (← links)
- Adjustment and social choice (Q1873907) (← links)
- On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules (Q1882190) (← links)
- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures (Q1908005) (← links)
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't (Q2365784) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions (Q2386286) (← links)
- Manipulability of consular election rules (Q2417407) (← links)
- Independent social choice correspondences (Q2563808) (← links)
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties (Q2673159) (← links)
- (Q4681553) (← links)
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions (Q5076342) (← links)