Pages that link to "Item:Q2386337"
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The following pages link to Manipulability measures of common social choice functions (Q2386337):
Displaying 40 items.
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models (Q284375) (← links)
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings (Q449038) (← links)
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives (Q449050) (← links)
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Q452827) (← links)
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810) (← links)
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness (Q532698) (← links)
- Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules (Q607476) (← links)
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies (Q705955) (← links)
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition (Q862542) (← links)
- Interjacency (Q922249) (← links)
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences (Q930485) (← links)
- The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas (Q995675) (← links)
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains (Q1014329) (← links)
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour (Q1042332) (← links)
- Manipulation of choice (agenda theory) (Q1066785) (← links)
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions (Q1083004) (← links)
- Manipulability of choice aggregations (Q1206335) (← links)
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation. (Q1811244) (← links)
- Defending against strategic manipulation in uninorm-based multi-agent decision making (Q1848621) (← links)
- On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules (Q1882190) (← links)
- Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information (Q2049488) (← links)
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules (Q2128950) (← links)
- Network topology design to influence the effects of manipulative behaviors in a social choice procedure (Q2137096) (← links)
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
- Strategic voting and nomination (Q2247944) (← links)
- Dictatorship versus manipulability (Q2334835) (← links)
- On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture (Q2345150) (← links)
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions (Q2386286) (← links)
- Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions (Q2388766) (← links)
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? (Q2389767) (← links)
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules (Q2391056) (← links)
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505) (← links)
- Robustness against inefficient manipulation (Q2460084) (← links)
- Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation (Q2490939) (← links)
- (Q4681553) (← links)
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation (Q5053694) (← links)
- Voting Procedures, Complexity of (Q5150301) (← links)
- Generalized manipulability of fuzzy social choice functions (Q5176822) (← links)
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules (Q5964648) (← links)