Pages that link to "Item:Q2432505"
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The following pages link to Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505):
Displaying 33 items.
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models (Q284375) (← links)
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey (Q334204) (← links)
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives (Q449050) (← links)
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules (Q464615) (← links)
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810) (← links)
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness (Q532698) (← links)
- Losses due to manipulation of social choice rules (Q607476) (← links)
- Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict (Q688540) (← links)
- Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs (Q952695) (← links)
- On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions (Q976973) (← links)
- Manipulability of choice aggregations (Q1206335) (← links)
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences (Q1331066) (← links)
- On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules (Q1882190) (← links)
- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures (Q1908005) (← links)
- Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections (Q2208855) (← links)
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
- Strategic voting and nomination (Q2247944) (← links)
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't (Q2365784) (← links)
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127) (← links)
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions (Q2386286) (← links)
- Changes that cause changes (Q2388777) (← links)
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory (Q2426958) (← links)
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules (Q2450082) (← links)
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis (Q2463576) (← links)
- (Q4681553) (← links)
- The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (Q5053687) (← links)
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation (Q5053694) (← links)
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (Q5053696) (← links)
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report (Q5053701) (← links)
- Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule (Q5501960) (← links)
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules (Q5964648) (← links)
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule (Q6564045) (← links)
- Probabilistic models of profiles for voting by evaluation (Q6624515) (← links)