Pages that link to "Item:Q2434231"
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The following pages link to Ex post participation constraint in a principal-agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard (Q2434231):
Displaying 12 items.
- Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? (Q776858) (← links)
- Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard (Q1317328) (← links)
- Identification of participation constraints in contracts (Q1626993) (← links)
- The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent (Q1651880) (← links)
- Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models (Q2031190) (← links)
- Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams (Q2325669) (← links)
- Screening teams of moral and altruistic agents (Q2669118) (← links)
- Impacts of uncertain project duration and asymmetric risk sensitivity information in project management (Q2816371) (← links)
- DEALING WITH MONOTONICITY CONSTRAINTS IN SCREENING PROBLEMS: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL (Q5269530) (← links)
- Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models (Q6059546) (← links)
- Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard (Q6059551) (← links)
- Optimal technology design (Q6163287) (← links)
