Pages that link to "Item:Q2442836"
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The following pages link to Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China (Q2442836):
Displaying 14 items.
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission (Q523008) (← links)
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement (Q1283855) (← links)
- Epsilon-stability in school choice (Q1697834) (← links)
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents (Q1735759) (← links)
- Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation (Q1753433) (← links)
- Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition (Q2067372) (← links)
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions (Q2206795) (← links)
- High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis (Q2218558) (← links)
- Self-selection in school choice (Q2273935) (← links)
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study (Q2416636) (← links)
- Implementing quotas in university admissions: an experimental analysis (Q2442854) (← links)
- Simultaneous screening and college admissions (Q2512356) (← links)
- Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity (Q6494262) (← links)
- Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey (Q6541997) (← links)