The following pages link to On exiting after voting (Q2491086):
Displaying 8 items.
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency (Q683523) (← links)
- Voting for voters: the unanimity case (Q1414442) (← links)
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness (Q1704055) (← links)
- Stability and voting by committees with exit (Q1762858) (← links)
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (Q2248911) (← links)
- An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit (Q2384877) (← links)
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences (Q2519487) (← links)
- Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options (Q2667240) (← links)