Pages that link to "Item:Q2496238"
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The following pages link to Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models (Q2496238):
Displaying 22 items.
- Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning (Q263391) (← links)
- On the value of randomization (Q402095) (← links)
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information (Q449184) (← links)
- Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word (Q868605) (← links)
- An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values (Q894059) (← links)
- Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation (Q894072) (← links)
- Mechanism design with collusive supervision (Q1001815) (← links)
- Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result (Q1682735) (← links)
- Consulting collusive experts (Q2195705) (← links)
- The role of the agent's outside options in principal-agent relationships (Q2268129) (← links)
- Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case (Q2271361) (← links)
- Endogenous information and stochastic contracts (Q2276551) (← links)
- Robust mechanisms: the curvature case (Q2323295) (← links)
- Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams (Q2325669) (← links)
- Optimal bunching without optimal control (Q2373782) (← links)
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives (Q2402061) (← links)
- Informed principal with correlation (Q2519479) (← links)
- Bundled Payments For Healthcare Services: Proposer Selection and Information Sharing (Q3465580) (← links)
- Stochastic Programming Perspective on the Agency Problems Under Uncertainty (Q4558806) (← links)
- Discrete‐time dynamic principal–agent models: Contraction mapping theorem and computational treatment (Q4991626) (← links)
- Dynamic delegation with a persistent state (Q6059560) (← links)
- Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms (Q6072236) (← links)
